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This is a preliminary paper at the very early stages of development.  It seeks to 
map out the areas of law and policy, critical issues and core questions associated 
with the research topic.  It is thus a conceptual outline rather than a paper per se. 
 
  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The South China Sea (SCS), which extends over 3.5 million kilometres with an 
average depth of 2000 metres1 has become synonymous with intractable 
territorial and maritime delimitation disputes with the disagreement over the 
Spratly Archipelago (involving six nations - China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Brunei, Philippines) and the Paracel Archipelago (3 nations – Vietnam, China and 
Taiwan) being the most high profile of the disputes.2   
 
The various disputes, which began to crystallise in the 1970s – with the 
discovery of oil – led to clashes between nations (particularly between China and 
Vietnam and China and the Philippines) in the late 1980s and early to mid- 
1990s.3  Although relations appeared to improve in the late 1990s/ early 2000s 
between China and the other competing nations, tensions became apparent in 
                                                        
1 Guifang (Julia) Xue, “Deep Danger: Intensified Competition in the South China Sea and 
Implications for China” 17 (2011 – 2012) Ocean & Coastal LJ 307 – 331 at 308. 
2 For an excellent overview of the origins of the various claims and disputes in the SCS see Nong 
Hong, UNCLOS and Ocean Dispute Settlement. Law and Politics in the South China Sea (Routledge 
2012), chapter 2. 
3 Christopher C. Joyner, “The Spratly Islands Dispute: Rethinking the Interplay of Law, Diplomacy, 
and Geo-politics in the South China Sea” 13 (1998) IJMCL 193 – 236. 
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2009 as littoral states submitted information on their proposed continental shelf 
limits to the 1982 UNCLOS Continental Shelf Commission and responded to the 
submissions of rival claimants.4  Unfortunately this tension has not been 
restricted to the exchange of terse diplomatic notes, and clashes between fishing 
vessels, oil exploration vessels and naval vessels belonging to both China and 
Vietnam occurred in 2011.5  In November 2013 China declared an Air Defense 
Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea drawing criticism from states 
outside of the region, notably the US, and is apparently contemplating an ADIZ in 
the South China Sea.6  The year 2014 has been dominated by reports that China 
is artificially enhancing and occupying reefs in the Spratly archipelago.  For 
example, the Johnson South Reef, until recently submerged is now occupied and, 
according to the Philippines, will provide the foundation for an airbase 800 miles 
from mainland China.7  More generally, all of the states in the region are 
becoming increasingly militarised and more assertive in terms of their various 
claims.8 
 
The SCS is of importance in terms of potential oil and gas resources, fish stocks 
(including yellow fin tuna) and has been described as a maritime super 
highway.9  Of equal if not greater significance is its strategic importance 
(demonstrated by the fact that Japan occupied some of the Spratly Islands during 
WW2) to states within and beyond the region.  Hence the interest of the US, 
Japan and other states in security and safety of shipping in the SCS more 
generally. 
 
Given the intractability of the territorial and maritime disputes, the littoral and 
other interested states as well as academic commentators have increasingly 
                                                        
4 See generally Ted L. McDorman, “The South China Sea after 2009: Clarity of Claims and 
Enhanced Prospects for Regional Cooperation” 24 (2010) Ocean Yearbook 507 – 535. 
5 See generally Ramses Amer, “China, Vietnam, and the South China Sea: Disputes and Dispute 
Management” 45 (2014) Ocean Development and International Law 17 – 40. 
6 See “China’s Declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea: 
Implications for Public International Law” 18(17) 19 August 2014 ASIL Insights at 
http://www.asil.org/print/1611.  
7 See http://thebulletin.org/flashpoint-south-china-sea7736.  
8 Chris Rahman and Martin Tsamenyi, “A Strategic Perspective on Security and Naval Issues in 
the South China Sea” 41 (2010) Ocean Development and International Law 315 – 333 at 329. 
9 Guifang (Julia) Xue, “Deep Danger: Intensified Competition in the South China Sea and 
Implications for China” 17 (2011 – 2012) Ocean & Coastal LJ 307 – 331 at 308. 
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turned to a more indirect approach to improving cooperation between the 
disputant states: a focus on non-traditional security concerns.10  Essentially, as a 
means of confidence building either to resolve the various disputes between the 
littoral nations or as a pathway to developing an alternative approach to 
territorial sovereignty.  Commentators frequently invoke the examples of the 
Arctic and Antarctic in this respect. 
 
What I would like to do in this paper, as part of this project, is to explore the 
extent to which a focus on non-traditional security concerns actually represents 
a viable pathway either to the resolution of the territorial and maritime 
delimitation disputes between the competing claimants or to the development of 
a long term interim solution whereby a framework is developed allowing states 
to manage the region without resolving those disputes. 
 
In doing so, this paper has or at least will have the following components: a brief 
overview of the disputes in the SCS and an assessment of why they are 
particularly intractable; a brief overview of the global and regional regime which 
applies to the SCS within which a small number of key principles and concepts of 
particular relevance to the management of non-traditional security issues will be 
highlighted; a brief introduction to what non-traditional security interests mean 
in the region and an attempt to identify key areas of cooperation; a brief 
introduction to the institutional infrastructure present in the region and how 
these institutions might or might not support non-traditional security 
cooperative initiatives and finally, an assessment of whether, even if such 
cooperation were successful in relation to individual initiatives this actually gets 
us any further in relation to addressing the more fundamental sovereignty and 
territorial disputes.  In this final section I also intend to briefly address whether 
the Arctic or Antarctic provide helpful precedents or lessons for the SCS region. 
 
 
 
                                                        
10 See generally Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou (eds), Non-traditional Security Issues and the South 
China Sea. Shaping a Framework for Cooperation (Ashgate 2014). 
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2. Territorial and Maritime Disputes in the SCS 
 
For the purposes of this paper today I intend to say very little about these 
disputes, which have been canvassed in a number of other presentations today.  I 
will simply confine myself to a small number of remarks relating to why there is, 
I think, general consensus that this is a particularly problematic area and why 
therefore, it is sensible to consider a more indirect approach to dispute 
resolution in the SCS. 
 
First, there are multiple disputes involving up to six nations and the disputes 
vary in nature.  Some we would categorise as maritime delimitation, others are 
territorial disputes with obvious consequences for maritime zones.11  There is 
consequently a significant level of complexity to these disputes. 
 
Second, there is a substantial disparity between the political, economic and 
military might of the nations involved in the disputes with China on the on hand 
and states such as Vietnam, Philippines and Malaysia on the other.  Given that 
China has indicated that it does not wish to engage in formal dispute resolution – 
                                                        
11 See generally Robert Beckman, “The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime 
Disputes in the South China Sea” (2013) 107 AJIL 142 – 163; Wendy N. Duong, “Following the 
Path of Oil: The Law of the Sea or Realpolitik – What Good Does Law do in the South China Sea 
Territorial Conflicts?” 30 (2006 – 2007) Fordham International Law Journal 1098 – 1208; 
Christopher C. Joyner, “The Spratly Islands Dispute: Rethinking the Interplay of Law, Diplomacy, 
and Geo-politics in the South China Sea” 13 (1998) IJMCL 193 – 236; Ted L. McDorman, “The 
South China Sea Islands Dispute in the 1990s – A New Multilateral Process and continuing 
Friction” 8 (1993) IJMCL 263 – 285; Guifang (Julia) Xue, “Deep Danger: Intensified Competition in 
the South China Sea and Implications for China” 17 (2011 – 2012) Ocean & Coastal LJ 307 – 331.  
For a more detailed discussion on the disputes between China and Vietnam see: Ramses Amer, 
“China, Vietnam, and the South China Sea: Disputes and Dispute Management” 45 (2014) Ocean 
Development and International Law 17 – 40; John D Ciociari and Jessica Chen Weiss, “The Sino-
Vietnamese Standoff in the South China Sea” 13 (2012) Geo. J. Int’l Aff. 61 – 69;  Junwu Pan, 
“Territorial Dispute between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea: A Chinese Lawyer’s 
Perspective” 5 (2012) Journal of East Asia and International Law 213 – 234; Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, 
China versus Vietnam: An Analysis of the Competing Claims in the South China Sea (A CNA 
Occasional Paper 2014).  For a detailed discussion of the dispute between China and the 
Philippines see: Bing Bing Jia, “A Preliminary Study of the Title to Huangyan Island (Scarborough 
Reef/ Shoal” 45 (2014) Ocean Development and International Law 360 – 373; Mark E Rosen, 
Philippine Claims in the South China Sea: A Legal Analysis (A CNA Occasional Paper, 2014); 
Michael Sheng-ti Gau, “The Sino-Philippine Arbitration of the South China Sea Nine-Dash Line 
Dispute: Applying the Rule of Default Appearance” 28 (2014) Ocean Yearbook 81 – 133; Andreas 
Zimmermann and Jelena Baumler, “Navigating Through Narrow Jurisdictional Straits: The 
Philippines-PRC South China Sea Dispute and UNCLOS” 12 (2013) The Law and Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals 431 – 461. 
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a position made clear in its response to the initiation of proceedings by the 
Philippines12 and that it wishes to resolve disputes or cooperate on a bilateral as 
opposed to multilateral basis 13  this makes achieving dispute resolution 
particularly challenging. 
 
Third, Taiwan claims rights and is party to some of the disputes in the region – 
including the Spratly Islands but is not generally recognised as a state and 
consequently is limited both in its interaction with regional institutions and with 
other states in the region.14 
 
Fourth, a number of the claims are in respect of geological features over which 
there is dispute as to whether they constitute rocks or islands for the purposes of 
Article 123 of UNCLOS and the parties in question have generally not made clear 
as to whether the maritime zones being claimed constitute merely a territorial 
sea or a continental shelf and EEZ.15  Furthermore, most claimant states have yet 
to identify baselines from which the various boundaries are drawn.16 
 
Finally, the Chinese claim in particular is controversial relying on the so-called 
nine-dash line and the concept of historic rights.  It is thus far from certain that 
its basis of claim is therefore compatible with UNCLOS.17 
                                                        
12 See Yu Mincai, “China’s Responses to the Compulsory Arbitration on the South China Sea 
Dispute: Legal Effects and Policy Options” 45 (2014) Ocean Development and International Law 1 
– 16; Stefan Talmon and Bing Bing Jia, The South China Sea Arbitration.  A Chinese Perspective 
(Hart, OUP, 2014); 
13  
14 For a discussion of Taiwan’s limited participation within the various fora concerned with the 
SCS see Yann-Huei Song, “The South China Sea Workshop Process and Taiwan’s Participation” 41 
(2010) Ocean Development and International Law 253 – 269. 
15 See Robert C Beckman and Clive H Schofield, “Defining EEZ Claims from Islands: a Potential 
South China Sea Change” 29 (2014) IJMCL 193 – 243; Yann-huei Song, “The Application of Article 
121(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention to the Five Selected Disputed Islands in the South China 
Sea” 27 (2009) Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law and Affairs 43 – 66. 
16 Ibid and Jonathan I Charney, “Central East Asian Maritime Boundaries and the Law of the Sea” 
89 (1995) AJIL 724 – 749; Tara Davenport, “Southeast Asian Approaches to Maritime 
Boundaries” 4 (2014) Asian Journal of International Law 309 – 357. 
17 See Florian Dupuy and Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “A Legal Analysis of China’s Historic Rights Claim 
in the South China Sea” 107(2013) AJIL 124 – 141; Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, “The Nine-Dash 
Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications” 107 (2013) AJIL 98 – 124; Jianming 
Shen, “China’s Sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands: A Historical Perspective” 1 (2002) 
Chinese Journal of International Law 94 – 157; Kuan-Hsiung Wang, “The ROC’s Maritime Claims 
and Practices with Special Reference to the South China Sea” 41 (2010) Ocean Development and 
International Law 237 – 252. 
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3. The Global and Regional Framework for Cooperation in the SCS 
 
Turning to the global and regional framework for cooperation in the SCS.  Again, 
I intend to say little about it for the purposes of this presentation and note that 
there has already been intensive discussion of various UNCLOS provisions today 
and of course much of this was set out in Don’s excellent background paper.18 
 
UNCLOS, which sets out the globally applicable principles applying to all 
maritime areas and activities has been ratified by all states in the region and has 
been endorsed by those states, through several ASEAN declarations. 
 
Two provisions are worth briefly highlighting for the purposes of this 
presentation.   
 
First, Article 123, which requires states bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed 
seas (of which the SCS is one) to cooperate directly or through an appropriate 
regional organisation in relation to environmental including living resources 
management and marine scientific research.  One commentator has argued that 
Article 123 is in fact not limited to these areas and provides for a much more 
general level of cooperation, including in relation to the exploitation of non-
living resources.19  This is a key question in this research paper – what are the 
obligations on littoral states to address non-traditional security issues within 
enclosed or semi-enclosed seas.   
 
The second article (in fact, articles) of particular relevance is Article 74(3) and 
83 (3) of UNCLOS which requires states to make every effort pending maritime 
delimitation to enter into, without prejudice, provisional arrangements of a 
                                                        
18 See more generally Nong Hong, UNCLOS and Ocean Dispute Settlement. Law and Politics in the 
South China Sea (Routledge 2012); Dong Manh Nguyen, “Settlement of Disputes under the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: The Case of the South China Sea Dispute” 25 
(2006) University of Queensland Law Journal 145 – 180; Yann-Huei Song and Stein Tonnesson, 
“The Impact of the Law of the Sea Convention on Conflict and Conflict Management in the South 
China Sea” 44 (2013) Ocean Development and International Law 235 – 269. 
19 See Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu, “Semi-enclosed Troubled Waters: A New Thinking on the Application 
of the 1982 UNCLOS Article 123 to the South China Sea” 41 (2010) Ocean Development and 
International Law 281 – 314. 
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practical nature.  This provision typically provides the basis for joint 
development arrangements for example, but is by no means restricted to 
exploitation agreements.  In fact, if you apply Article 123 and Articles 74(3)/ 
83(3) cumulatively you arguably have a clear and principled legal basis for 
cooperative action within the SCS, particularly in respect of environmental 
protection and resource management.  These provisions are of course also 
supported by other sections of UNCLOS, notably, Part XII. 
 
4. Regional Developments: ASEAN and the Law of the Sea 
 
At the regional level there are several initiatives designed to support the 
implementation of UNCLOS and these initiatives are primarily soft law in nature 
and, in terms of substance, focused on environmental protection or enhancement 
of peaceful cooperation.  
 
Probably the most important instrument for the purposes of this paper is the 
2002 ASEAN/ China Declaration on the Code of Parties in the South China Sea.  
This builds on the Declaration on the South China Sea adopted in 1992 and sets 
out a number of broad principles in order to improve cooperation and relations 
within the region.  Principles include: the need to resolve territorial and 
jurisdictional disputes without resorting to force and in accordance with 
UNCLOS and other principles of international law; the exercise of restraint in 
respect of activities that may complicate or exacerbate disputes; a reaffirmation 
of states’ commitment to UNCLOS, in particular, the principle of freedom of 
navigation and overflight; and a commitment to cooperate in respect of issues 
including marine environmental protection, MSR, SAR and combatting 
transnational crime.20  These issues might otherwise be described as non-
traditional security issues and the Code of Conduct complements the broader 
Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional 
Security Issues also adopted in 2002 and which has an important maritime focus.  
                                                        
20 See WU Shicun and REN Huaifeng, “More than a Declaration: A Commentary on the 
Background and the Significance of the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South 
China Sea” 2 (2003) Chinese Journal of International Law 311 – 320. 
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Described as a “landmark in the history of Sino-ASEAN relations”21 the DOC is a 
soft law instrument.  The principles it endorses however, are arguably 
nevertheless binding under UNCLOS or international law more generally.   
 
More recently, attempts have been made to develop a more substantial Code of 
Conduct.  In 2011 Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC were adopted, 
which set out a highly conservative set of principles designed to guide the 
development of cooperative projects.  Principles include – the participation of 
cooperative arrangements on a voluntary basis, the importance of consensus and 
the need to develop confidence building measures in a step-by step incremental 
fashion.  Attempts to adopt a full Code of Conduct have so far not been successful.  
The Philippines prepared a draft in 2012, which was subsequently revised by 
ASEAN but which failed to gain the support of China.22  Nevertheless, progress 
has been made from time to time in respect of individual issues – such as the 
2010 ASEAN Declaration on Cooperation in Search and Rescue of Persons and 
Vessels in Distress at Sea. 
 
With respect to environmental protection, a quintessential non-traditional 
security issue, there are a plethora of initiatives which either focus on or 
encompass as part of a broader remit, the SCS.  Examples include the UNEP East 
Asian Regional Seas Programme, comprising a non-binding action plan managed 
by the Coordinating Body on the Seas of East Asia (COBSEA), which is now also 
responsible for the continuation of the UNEP/ GEF South China Sea Project 
(which was concluded in 2009); the Partnership in Environmental Management 
for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA) supported by GEF, UNEP and the IMO – the 
SCS constitutes a sub-region in PEMSEA; and the South China Sea Large Marine 
Ecosystem Project.23   
 
                                                        
21 Ibid at 311. 
22 Carlyle A Thayer, “ASEAN’s Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for 
Community Building?” 10 (issue 34, number 4) (2012) The Asia Pacific Journal. 
23 Shih-Ming Kao, Nathaniel Sifford Pearre and Jeremy Firestone, “Regional Cooperation in the 
South China Sea: Analysis of Existing Practices and Prospects” 43 (2012) Ocean Development and 
International Law 283 – 295 at 286 – 288. 
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These initiatives, like those developed within ASEAN are non-binding and this 
preference for soft over hard instruments is quite dominant within the region.  
For example, two specific agreements to conserve wildlife in the region – sea 
turtles24 and dugongs25 adopted pursuant to the Migratory Species Convention26 
are non-binding.   Soft law can of course provide a pathway to binding 
obligations and it is worth noting in this context the Memorandum of agreement 
between the Philippines and Malaysia on the establishment of the turtle island 
heritage protected area, which, notwithstanding the use of the appellation MOA 
is clearly a binding a agreement setting out quite detailed obligations to protect 
the nesting area of the green and hawksbill turtles.27 
 
5. Non-traditional Security Interests in the SCS 
 
The very brief overview of the regional framework of obligations and initiatives 
in the South China Sea demonstrates that the littoral states are already 
developing a strong focus on what, since 9/11, are typically described as non-
traditional security interests.  What constitutes security – traditional or 
otherwise is undoubtedly contested28 and I was interested that Don in his 
background paper referred to piracy as a traditional security interest,29 which, in 
the context of the history of the law of the sea, is an appropriate description, 
although today piracy is commonly included by commentators in the list of non-
traditional security interests.30  Accepting the demarcation between traditional 
and non-traditional security interests is porous, the latter term is commonly 
                                                        
24  
25  
26  
27 Memorandum of agreement between the government of the republic of the Philippines and the 
government of Malaysia on the establishment of the turtle island heritage protected area 
reproduced in 5 (2002) Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy 157 – 161. 
28 See Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol” 67 (1952) Political Science 
Quarterly 481 – 502; David A Baldwin, “The concept of security” 23 (1997) Review of 
International Studies 5 – 26; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “Redefining Security” 68 (1988 – 1990) 
Foreign Affairs 162 – 177; and Hitoshi Nasu, “Law and policy for Antarctic Security. An Analytical 
Framework” in Alan D Hemmings, Donald R Rothwell and Karen N. Scott, Antarctic Security in the 
Twenty-First Century. Legal and Policy Perspectives (Routledge 2012) 18 – 32. 
29  
30 For example, in Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou (eds), Non-traditional Security Issues and the South 
China Sea. Shaping a Framework for Cooperation (Ashgate 2014) three of the chapters focus on 
maritime piracy. 
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used to refer to issues that are not military in the traditional sense and which are 
not normally considered integral to a state’s identity such as territory or political 
independence.  Issues which are commonly fall into this category include – but 
are by no means limited to – environmental pollution, climate change, piracy, 
illicit trade in people, drugs, arms and wildlife and terrorism.31  The latter, 
depending on the scale and nature of the threat can equally be classified as a 
traditional security threat. 
 
Because these issues are not necessarily integral to a state’s identity and because 
they typically affect several if not all states in a region or area they can be used as 
a basis to develop cooperative, confidence building arrangements.  In the Arctic 
for example, concerted attempts were made to improve relations between states 
– in particular, the Cold War rivals, the US and the USSR, through cooperation in 
relation to environmental matters in the region.32  The Antarctic provides an 
archetypal example of a cooperative arrangement within which states with 
competing territorial claims and states which do not recognise any territorial 
claims are quite successfully managing issues such as scientific research, 
exploitation of living resources and environmental protection.33  So, does this 
represent a viable pathway towards managing or even resolving the territorial 
or what might otherwise be described as hard security issues in the South China 
Sea? 
 
Timo Kivimaki argues in support of this proposition.  He states “[t]he focus on 
non-traditional security threats as a way to focus on something that unites 
rather than on something that divides is, in general, in line with the East Asian 
way of dealing with conflicts.   The fact that this discursive approach diverts 
attention from conflicts and frames interaction in a cooperative manner is at the 
core of the East Asian way.”34  Similarly, Nong Hong in her book titled UNCLOS 
                                                        
31  
32  
33  
34 Timo Kivimaki, “Regional Cooperation and Joint Development in the South China Sea: Speech 
that Acts and Action that Speaks” in Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou (eds), Non-traditional Security 
Issues and the South China Sea. Shaping a Framework for Cooperation (Ashgate 2014) 17 – 31 at 
25 – 26. 
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and Ocean Dispute Settlement. Law and Politics in the South China Sea concludes 
her study with a focus on non-traditional security threats and provides a 
relatively positive assessment of the opportunities they present for the region.35  
A survey of recent literature on the South China Sea reveals as much on the 
prospects of cooperation in relation to joint development of resources or marine 
protected areas as on the traditional areas of territorial disputes and maritime 
delimitation.36  Moreover, the various declarations, statements and initiatives 
adopted under the auspices of ASEAN and other regional organisations also 
appear to endorse cooperation on non-traditional security threats as a pathway 
to peace and the resolution of disputes in the region. 
 
On the other hand, these statements have taken on a somewhat rhetorical tone.  
Relatively few initiatives in the South China Sea have been adopted at the 
multilateral or regional level – there are a greater number of bilateral initiatives 
– and, as noted in the introduction to this paper, tensions over territory and 
other maritime disputes has in fact increased in the recent past.  Chris Rahman 
and Martin Tsamenyi conclude rather more pessimistically “[s]upposedly 
common regional interests in SLOC security, marine environmental protection 
and conservation of fish stocks, energy security, combatting transnational crime, 
and even mitigating the potential negative effects of climate change all require 
cooperative approaches if they are to be satisfactorily addressed.  However, the 
region still lacks effective mechanisms by which to achieve practical cooperation, 
and the reality of regional political life means that those challenges are as likely 
to divide states as to unite them… Any thoughts that the South China Sea can 
become a zone of peace and cooperation may have to be placed on hold for some 
time.”37  Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu is similarly sceptical, describing the prospects for 
cooperation in the SCS as “not very promising.”38 
 
                                                        
35 Nong Hong, UNCLOS and Ocean Dispute Settlement. Law and Politics in the South China Sea 
(Routledge 2012) chapter ? 
36 See the references noted in Part 6, infra. 
37 Chris Rahman and Martin Tsamenyi, “A Strategic Perspective on Security and Naval Issues in 
the South China Sea” 41 (2010) Ocean Development and International Law 315 – 333 at 329. 
38 Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu, “Semi-enclosed Troubled Waters: A New Thinking on the Application of 
the 1982 UNCLOS Article 123 to the South China Sea” 41 (2010) Ocean Development and 
International Law 281 – 314 at 304. 
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Before coming to a conclusion myself over whether this represents a viable 
pathway to peace and reconciliation in the region it is I think important to try to 
identify which non-traditional security issues have the potential to make a 
contribution to this process and whether there are institutional supporting 
mechanisms in this respect.  It is also I  think important to bear in mind that 
cooperation in relation to many if not all of these non-traditional security issues 
is likely to benefit the region if not the international community even if they 
don’t actually lead to the reconciliation of the various disputes.  So a pessimistic 
conclusion in this paper does not actually mean that we shouldn’t support these 
various initiatives.   
 
6. Non-Traditional Security Interests in the SCS 
 
Given that we do not have an exhausted list of non-traditional security interests, 
which interests provide a potential platform for cooperation?  Well, we could 
start with the ASEAN declarations on the South China Sea which identify, as I 
noted earlier, interests including environmental protection, MSR, safety of 
navigation, SAR and combatting transnational crime including drugs, piracy and 
trade in illegal arms.  Commentators have added others to the list including the 
management of submarine cables, 39  fisheries management 40  and climate 
change.41 
 
Three issues have received the most attention from states and academic 
commentators to date and for the purposes of this paper I am going to highlight 
very briefly each of those. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
39  
40  
41 Robin Warner, “The Portents of Changing Climate: Maritime Security Implications for the South 
China Sea” in Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou (eds), Non-traditional Security Issues and the South 
China Sea. Shaping a Framework for Cooperation (Ashgate 2014) 241 – 256. 
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(a) Piracy and Robbery 
 
The first of those non-traditional security threats is piracy and robbery.  In their 
volume on Non-traditional Security Issues and the South China Sea, which argues 
that a focus on these issues provides a pathway to resolving disputes within the 
regin, Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou devote three chapters to piracy.  Within the 
region piracy is regularly discussed within multiple fora and a regional initiative: 
the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships in Asia (ReCAPP) has been established.42  Logically, cooperating in 
relation to piracy and armed robbery provides an excellent means to build trust 
and confidence between the competing claimant states and in of itself clearly 
makes a contribution to the security of the region, of significance to the 
international community more generally, but it is not obvious that this is an issue 
which provides a pathway towards the resolution of the territorial and maritime 
disputes in the region. 
 
(b) Joint Development 
 
The second issue, which has probably garnered the most attention from both 
commentators and states is joint development of transboundary resources or of 
resources in areas under dispute. 43  In contrast to piracy, joint development in 
contested areas has “increasingly been recognized by the international 
community as a peaceful and pragmatic alternative to settle the economic and 
emotional battles of competing sovereign claims…”44  Although China has 
consistently refused to adjudicate disputes it has indicated willingness to enter 
into joint development agreements.45  More generally, half of the delimitation 
agreements in the Southeast Asian region contain provisions dealing with 
                                                        
42  
43 See generally Robert Beckman, Ian Townsend-Gault, Clive Schofield and Tara Davenport (eds), 
Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Legal Frameworks for the Joint Development of 
Hydrocarbon Resources (Edward Elgar 2013). 
44 Wendy N. Duong, “Following the Path of Oil: The Law of the Sea or Realpolitik – What Good 
Does Law do in the South China Sea Territorial Conflicts?” 30 (2006 – 2007) Fordham 
International Law Journal 1098 – 1208 at 1143. 
45 Ibid at 1155. 
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transboundary resources46 and Tara Davenport has noted that “the relatively 
high number of Provisional Arrangements entered into by Southeast Asian states 
in lieu of boundaries reflects a preference for solutions which aim to maintain 
peace and good relations between parties rather than resolve the underlying 
cause of the dispute.”47  The creation of joint development zones is clearly 
compatible with UNCLOS and can be supported under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) 
of the Convention, which calls upon parties to enter into practical agreements of 
a provisional nature pending final delimitation – which could of course be an 
Antarctic Treaty like agreement to disagree rather than the actual resolution of 
boundaries between competing states. 
 
However, there are some significant issues within the region, which arguably 
serve as a caution to undue optimism.  First, as I briefly noted earlier in some 
areas, notably the Spratlys, it has yet to be determined whether some of the 
geological features are rocks – in which case any maritime zone is confined to a 
territorial sea (for resource exploitation purposes) or islands – which generate a 
continental shelf and EEZ.  Without such a determination it is difficult to see how 
joint development agreements can be entered into.  A decision by two or more 
states to treat a feature as an island and enter into an agreement to jointly 
develop a significant area of the continental shelf clearly risks prejudicing the 
interests of other states, not part of the agreement and, the international 
community more generally – to the extent that the agreement prejudices other 
states’ high sea and Area rights.48  Similar issues arise in relation to baseline 
disputes.49 
 
Second, the practice so far in the South China Sea50 has relied on bilateral as 
opposed to multilateral agreements.  In other words, China prefers to deal with 
competing claimant states on an individual basis and is reluctant to enter into 
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multilateral negotiations.  In entering into an agreement with Vietnam and the 
Philippines in 2005 to undertake joint seismic research China was accused of 
“slicing up the unity of ASEAN”.51  More generally, the absence of a regional 
framework for joint development has, according to one author, “resulted in a de 
facto carving up of the South China Sea’s basins.”52 
 
Christopher Linebaugh has argued convincingly that the obligations imposed by 
Article 123 of UNCLOS to cooperate in the exercise of their rights within semi-
enclosed seas, in particular, in the area of environmental protection, require a 
multilateral approach to joint development negotiations.53  Discussion of ASEAN 
and China. 
 
(c) Marine Protected Areas 
 
The third issue for the purposes of this paper is the designation of marine 
protected areas.  This issue provides some support for those that argue for an 
Antarctic Treaty style solution for the South China Sea in that it emphasises 
environmental protection rather than resource extraction.  Without the 
emphasis on resource extraction, it may be easier to persuade states to enter 
into cooperative arrangements.  The idea of establishing marine protected areas 
– or accurately in the context of this region – peace parks is by no means new.  
John McManus advocated a Spratly Island marine park in 1992.54  Today, marine 
protected areas are considered to be a core mechanism for effective ocean 
environmental management55 and their legal basis within areas beyond national 
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jurisdiction is under active consideration.56  Unsurprisingly there has been 
significant academic discussion on the prospects of designating MPAs in the SCS 
within and beyond the Spratlys for a range of purposes including the protection 
of vulnerable ecosystems,57 fishing58 and the management of shipping.59  There 
would be little difficulty in justifying such measures under UNCLOS – Article 123 
and Part XII of the Convention providing a sound legal basis and of course there 
are now numerous instruments which support the designation of MPAs – 
including the Biodiversity Convention, Ramsar and the Migratory Species 
Convention.60 
 
Like joint development, the establishment of MPAs provides a mechanism for 
putting in place principles and processes for managing areas under dispute 
without actually resolving that dispute.  In contrast to joint development, the 
emphasis on environmental protection rather than exploitation may assist in 
defusing tensions.  A key to the current success of the Antarctic Treaty is the 
moratorium on commercial minerals exploitation and some commentators – 
such as Keyuan Zou have argued for a similar moratorium for the South China 
Sea.61  Whether the littoral states would agree to a moratorium is highly 
questionable however, given all those states’ – and particularly China’s growing 
demand for energy resources. 
 
In contrast to joint development there appears to be little state practice with 
respect to transboundary MPA designation – with the exception of the turtle 
island heritage area established by Malaysia and the Philippines, which I 
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57 See Hai Dang Vu, “Towards a Regional MPA Network in the South China Sea: General 
Perspectives and Specific Challenges” 26 (2012) Ocean Yearbook 291 – 316; Hai Dang Vu, 
“Towards a Network of Marine Protected Areas in the South China Sea: Options to Move 
Forward” 28 (2014) Ocean Yearbook 207 – 244.  See also the references ibid. 
58 Hai Dang Vu, “A Bilateral Network of Marine Protected Areas Between Vietnam and China: An 
Alternative to the Chinese Unilateral Fishing Ban in the South China Sea” 44 (2013) Ocean 
Development and International Law 145 – 169. 
59 Aldo Chircop, “Regional Cooperation in Marine Environmental Protection in the South China 
Sea: A Reflection on New Directions for Marine Conservation” 41 (2010) Ocean Development and 
International Law 334 – 356. 
60 See more generally, Hai Dang Vu (2014) note 57, supra. 
61 Keyuan Zou, “Realizing Sustainability in the South China Sea” in Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou 
(eds), Non-traditional Security Issues and the South China Sea. Shaping a Framework for 
Cooperation (Ashgate 2014) 207 – 224 at 218 – 220. 
17 
 
mentioned earlier.  Moreover, it is also worth noting that constituting a 
territorial tool, the problems  I noted in the context of joint development with 
respect to the status of rocks/ islands and the uncertainty of baselines are 
equally – although not perhaps as fundamentally – applicable here.  Finally, even 
where MPAs have laudable and legitimate environmental objectives it is not 
always possible to avoid issues of sovereignty, jurisdiction and control.  This is 
illustrated by the current debate over the proposed Ross Sea MPA in the 
Antarctic and concerns expressed by Russia and China that it – and the proposed 
Eastern Antarctic MPA - somehow serve the interest of the claimant states: New 
Zealand and Australia.62  It has also been illustrated in a rather different context 
by the dispute between the UK and Mauritius over the Chagos Islands MPA.63 
 
7. Institutions and Processes for Cooperation 
Of arguably equal importance to the need to identify areas of cooperation is the 
need to identify institutions or processes to facilitate that cooperation.  There are 
in fact numerous organisations that cover the SCS in terms of their mandate and 
this multiplicity is in fact not necessarily an advantage.  One feature of diplomacy 
in the region is 1.5 diplomatic track negotiations or fora within which individuals 
participate in a personal capacity.  The most well known of these is the SCS 
workshop process which was an Indonesian/ Canadian initiative in response to 
the conflict between China and Vietnam in the late 1980s and which constitutes a 
series of annual meetings – held from the early 1990s to date – designed to 
promote mutual understanding and the development of confidence building 
measures.64   Notably Taiwan participates in these meetings although its 
participation is constrained owing to China’s maintenance of the one-China 
policy.65  Whether these track 2 negotiations can lead to political compromise is 
however, uncertain. 
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A more promising option is ASEAN, which has, since the 1990s taken an 
increasing interest in the SCS disputes and is developing an ever closer 
relationship with China.66  All the SCS claimant states with the exception of China 
and Taiwan are ASEAN members.  Within ASEAN there are nine fora currently 
dealing with maritime issues including the ASEAN Maritime Forum and the 
ASEAN Expanded Maritime Forum.  The latter organisation is of particular 
interest as it includes partner states including Australia, China, India, Japan, New 
Zealand, Russia and the US.  It is also a 1.5 track process with academic 
participation.  Given the significance of the SCS to the international community 
and the interests that these partner states have in getting a resolution to the 
disputes there is I think merit in exploring as to whether this might provide an 
appropriate forum to take the lead in facilitating cooperative arrangements.  
Whether China, in particular, would be open to this arrangement is far from 
certain as China has regularly opposed any attempt to “internationalise” the 
disputes, preferring bilateral negotiation.67 
 
8. Concluding Remarks: A Pathway to Peace? 
 
So, in conclusion, assuming states are prepared to cooperate on these and other 
non-security issues, where does this lead us: to a path to peace or a road to 
nowhere? 
 
Well, at the very least such initiatives have the potential to build trust and 
confidence between the competing claimants and may assist in creating a 
diplomatic space where fruitful negotiations can take place.  The Arctic 
represents a pertinent example here demonstrating that cooperative initiatives 
in areas such as the environment can make a significant contribution to 
improving relations between states in the management of the region.  From the 
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beginnings of cooperation in the late 1980s it was only a relatively short period 
before the Arctic Council was established in 1996.  The Arctic also provides an 
interesting parallel to the SCS in that over the last 20 years or so it has 
transformed from essentially a regional issue to an international issue68 with 
many non-littoral states having an interest in its future management and indeed 
even becoming formal observers within the Arctic Council.  It is ironic that China, 
determined to resist the internationalisation of the SCS, has been a strong 
advocate of the internationalisation of the Arctic and its own participation and 
advocacy of Arctic interests.  However, the Arctic also represents the fragility of 
soft cooperative arrangements and the limitation of confidence building 
measures – particularly in the face of traditional security concerns and this of 
course is being currently demonstrated by the deterioration of relations between 
the Arctic states owing to Russia’s activities in the Ukraine. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum the Antarctic provides an example of a regime 
where claimant (and non-claimant) states have agreed to disagree over the 
status of the continent69 and, over 50 years, have developed a sophisticated and 
essentially successful cooperative regime based on the principles of peace, 
scientific research and environmental protection.  The Antarctic Treaty does 
provide a possible model for at least part of the SCS – perhaps the Spratly 
Archipelago area and a number of the claimant states, including China and 
Malaysia are familiar with the model, being Antarctic Treaty parties.  However, in 
contrast to the SCS, mineral resources in the Antarctic are not currently 
accessible and of course are currently subject to the moratorium.  The parties 
have agreed to treat the waters surrounding Antarctica as high seas for fisheries 
purposes and there is no arrangement in place to deal with access to and sharing 
of genetic biological resources.  Unless the littoral states in the SCS agree to a 
moratorium on oil and gas exploration – which is unlikely – the Antarctic Treaty 
is probably not an apposite model for the region. 
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The middle ground – between the Arctic and the Antarctic – is using cooperation 
in non-traditional security issues as a pathway to build trust and confidence in 
order to try to resolve the maritime disputes in favour of one or other of the 
claimant states.  This need not be a zero sum game.  The 1920 Svalbard Treaty, 
which applies to the Spitzbergen Archipelago in the Arctic,70 provides yet 
another model to manage contested territory.  Under the Treaty, Norway 
exercises sovereignty over the archipelago but does not exercise exclusive 
sovereign rights over the resources of Svalbard.  Other Treaty parties have rights 
of exploitation or extraction.  In light of the fact that the SCS states have generally 
indicated that they are in favour of joint development the Svalbard Treaty 
provides a potential model of how this might be implemented on a multilateral 
basis.  Agreeing the details of any such regime is however, likely to prove 
challenging.  It is notable that after many years of obscurity the Svalbard Treaty 
has generated much discussion in recent years owing to disagreements among 
its parties as to whether its principles apply to the EEZ or continental shelf – 
maritime zones not in existence at the time of its adoption in 1920.71   
 
In conclusion, I remain unconvinced that cooperation in relation to non-
traditional security issues represents a path to peace.  But I would not suggest 
that such cooperation leads us down a road to nowhere.  Irrespective of whether 
the claimant states manage to resolve their differences, improving cooperation in 
relation to issues such as environmental protection, resource management and 
transnational crime – including piracy – is likely to have clear benefits for the 
region and for the international community more generally.  In theory, they 
should also help build long term trust and confidence between states within the 
region.  As Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu says “[t]he bordering States should have the 
collective wisdom to solve their common problems within the region, but this is 
based on political will.”72   
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